Abstract: In 2010, Fan et al. presented an anonymous multi-receiver identity-based encryption scheme where they adopt Lagrange interpolating polynomial mechanism. They showed that their scheme makes it impossible for an attacker or any other message receiver to derive the identity of a message receiver such that the privacy of every receiver can be guaranteed. They also formally showed that every receiver in the proposed scheme is anonymous to any other receiver. In this work, the authors study the security of Fan et al.'s anonymous multi-receiver identity-based encryption scheme. It is regretful that they found their scheme is insecure. Every receiver in Fan et al.'s scheme is not anonymous to any other receiver. The authors showed that simple protocol changes can fix these weaknesses and render Fan et al.'s scheme. The improved scheme is proved to satisfy the confidentiality and receiver anonymity in the random oracle.
Introduction
Multi-receiver communication is of great importance in wireless communications. It deals with the problem of key management effectively such that the entire communication protocol is efficient. Many researchers focused on this topic and proposed many interesting protocols.
In an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, every user can select her/his identity (ID) freely, where some meaningful or easily memorised strings are usually selected as ID. Moreover, the problem of the authentication for public keys can also be solved if we take ID to form the public keys. ID-based cryptography has attracted a lot of researchers and has gained some results [1] [2] [3] [4] . In 2005, Du et al. [5] presented an IDbased broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution. They take use of the matrix operations for encryption and decryption. Unforturely, their scheme is insecure [6] . In 2005, Wang and Wu [7] proposed an ID-based multicast encryption scheme that has a key generation centre and a group centre. All users do not need any computation during the rekeying process. However, the sender must be the group centre. Besides, the problems of key updating were discussed frequently, but no efficient solution has been proposed. In 2010, Fan et al. [8] presented an anonymous multi-receiver IBE scheme where they adopt Lagrange interpolating polynomial mechanism to cope with the above problem.
In a multi-receiver encryption environment, a sender can randomly choose receivers. Every multi-receiver encryption scheme can be transformed into a broadcast encryption scheme or a multicast encryption scheme. Beak et al. [9] proposed a multi-receiver IBE along with a formal definition and security model for the kind of schemes. They proved the security in the selective-ID model using the random oracle technique. In 2006, Lu and Hu [10] presented a multirecipient public key encryption with pairing. Their scheme can be applied to broadcast sensitive information in an unsafe distributed environment. All of the multi-receiver IBE schemes proposed in the literature cannot protect the privacy of receivers or do not contain any discussion on this issue. In [8] , Fan et al. proposed a provably secure and efficient multi-receiver IBE scheme that can achieve the anonymity for every receiver against any other receiver. Everyone can receive a ciphertext broadcasted by a sender, but only the receivers selected by the sender can decipher the ciphertext successfully. Besides, one can examine whether herself/ himself is a selected receiver or not. Nobody, except the sender, knows who the other receivers are. They present how to design an efficient anonymous multi-receiver IBE scheme based on Lagrange interpolating polynomial theorem. Fan et al.'s scheme can be used in pay-TV or streaming audio/ video services. In some situations, such as ordering sensitive TV programmes, a receiver or customer usually expects that any other receiver or customer does not know her/his ID when ordering the TV programmes. Anonymous multireceiver IBE has a lot of applications. It is valuable to study this type of public key cryptography scheme.
It is regretful that we found Fan et al.'s scheme is insecure. Every receiver is not anonymous to any other receiver. We showed that simple protocol changes can fix these weaknesses and render Fan et al.'s scheme. The improved scheme is proved to satisfy the confidentiality and receiver anonymity in the random oracle. Our cryptanalysis and improvements will help experts and engineers design and develop anonymous multi-receiver IBE scheme.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we review Fan et al.'s anonymous multi-receiver IBE scheme. In Section 3, we give anonymity attack on Fan et al.'s scheme. In Section 4, we proposed the improvements on Fan et al.'s scheme. The security analysis was given in Section 5. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
Review of Fan et al.'s scheme
In this section, we review the polynomial interpolation method, the characteristics of bilinear groups, some hard problems and Fan et al.'s scheme [8] . In this paper, the symbol a [ R S denotes the element a is uniformly sampled at random from the set S.
2.1 Polynomial interpolation, bilinear groups and hard problems 2.1.1 Lagrange interpolating polynomial theorem:
i be a polynomial of degree t 2 1 ≥ 0 that passes through the t points (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . , (x t , y t ) where for each i
1.2 Bilinear groups: Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of prime order q and let P be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear mapping e: G 1 × G 1 G 2 has the following properties:
Proof: Suppose G-xyz-DDH-M is easy, then we obtain xyz-DDH-M is also easy as follows:
Given (P, aP, bP, cP, H ), we pick k 1 , k 2 [ Z * q and compute We define A's guessing advantage
The scheme is said to be (t, We define A's guessing advantage
The scheme is said to be (t, 1)-ANON-sID-CCA secure if for any ANON-sID-CCA attacker A, within polynomial running time t, the guessing advantage
is less than 1.
Definition 3 (ANON-sMID-CCA):
Let A be a polynomialtime attacker. Let be a general multi-receiver IBE scheme. A interacts with a Challenger in the following game: † Setup: It is the same as the Setup phase in Definition 2.
† Phase 1: A outputs a target identity set (ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n ). Upon receiving (ID 1 , ID 2 , . . . , ID n ), the Challenger randomly chooses a identity proper subset
A issues private key extraction queries. Upon receiving a private key extraction query, denoted by ID j , the Challenger runs the private key extraction algorithm to obtain d j ¼ Extract(params, s, ID j ). The only constraint is that ID j = ID i for i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n.
† Phase 3: A issues decryption queries for target IDs. Upon receiving a decryption query, denoted by (C, ID i ) for some i [ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the Challenger generates a private key associated with ID i , which is denoted by We define A's guessing advantage
The scheme is said to be (t, 1)-ANON-sMID-CCA secure if for any ANON-sMID-CCA attacker A, within polynomial running time t, the guessing advantage
is less than 1. Notes: From the Definitions 2 and 3, we know that ANONsID-CCA is a special case of ANON-sMID-CCA when t ¼ 1 and n ¼ 2.
Fan et al.'s scheme
Let G 1 be an additive group and G 2 be a multiplicative group where both of them are cyclic and each of them is with prime order q. Let P be a randomly chosen generator of G 1 and e be a bilinear mapping such that e: G 1 × G 1 G 2 . In Fan et al.'s scheme, a sender chooses t receivers and prepares t points (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), . . . , (x t , y t ) for them. For every receiver ID i , the sender sets x i as the root of F i (x) ¼ y i where the receiver's identity, ID i , is mapped into x i in Z * q . Then it computes y i ¼ yQ i as the personal private key of the receiver where y is randomly chosen in Z * q and ID i is also mapped into Q i in G * 1 . G * 1 denotes the set G 1 /{O}, and O is the ID element in the additive group G 1 .
The polynomial
is used for achieving receiver anonymity. In the Encrypt phase of Fan et al.'s scheme, the sender computes a parameter R i for each receiver i by using the above polynomial. The sender takes all R i 's and the other parameters to form a ciphertext encrypted by a secret key s and then broadcasts it. To decrypt the ciphertext, receiver i takes all R i 's and her/his x i to reconstruct l ¼ F i (x i ), which is y i . Then, the receiver computes the secret key s via her/his private key and l. Finally, the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext by using s. 
W, params, an identity ID i and the private key d i of the receiver with identity ID i . To decrypt C, the algorithm performs the tasks as follows:
A private key generator (PKG) is established to run Setup. When a user gives her/his ID to the PKG, the PKG inputs its public system parameters, the master key and the user's ID to Extract and returns a private key to the user. Users who have obtained their private keys from the PKG are called members. A user who sends out a message is said to be a sender. A sender can input the PKG's system parameters, the IDs of 
Input the ciphertext C ¼ (R 1 , . . . , R t , U 1 , U 2 , V, W ), params, an identity ID i and the private key d i of the receiver with identity ID i . We suppose that the set of the multi-receivers is S m , and ID i [ S m . Then, ID i can compute According to the above computation, f (x a ) has nothing to do with Q a . On the other hand, yH 1 (ID a ) is random. So, the probability that f (x a ) ¼ yH 1 (ID a ) holds is negligible.
Based on the above analysis, we know that
If ID k [ S m , then the receiver ID k can identify whether anyone is one of the designated receivers as follows:
) holds, then ID l belongs to S m , that is, ID l is one of the multi-receiver. The reason is that: if ID l belongs to S m , that is, ID l is one of the multi-receiver, then, , f (x k ) ) does not hold, ID l does not belong to S m , that is, ID l is not one of the multi-receiver. The reason is that:
Thus, every receiver can determine whether the other is one of the designated multi-receivers. Fan 
where
, params, an identity ID i and the private key d i of the receiver with identity ID i . To decrypt C, the algorithm performs the tasks as follows:
and test whether U = r 5 Analysis of our improved scheme
Correctness
The decryption of our scheme is correct as follows:
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we have that
We can obtain
Confidentiality and receiver anonymity
The security requirement of confidentiality is semantic security and receiver anonymity. It means that no useful information about a plaintext message can be gotten from the corresponding ciphertext. Our improved scheme's confidentiality is defined in the security notion 'Indistinguishability of encryptions under selective multi-ID, chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-sMID-CCA) [8, 9] '. Receiver anonymity means that every user only knows whether she/he is one of the exact receivers of a ciphertext, while she/he cannot determine whether any other user is an exact receiver or not. Our improved scheme's ANON-sMID-CCA is defined based on the security notion 'Anonymous indistinguishability of encryptions under selective-ID, chosen ciphertext attacks (ANON-sID-CCA) [8, 15] '.
Theorem 1:
The improved multi-receiver IBE scheme is (t, q H , q H1 , q H2 , q H2 , q H3 , q H4 , q 1 , q 2 , 1)-IND-sMID-CCA secure under the (t ′ , 1 ′ )-Co-DBDH assumption, where (q 1 , q 2 , q H , q H1 , q H2 , q H3 , q H4 denote the number of private key extraction queries, decryption queries and queries to the hash functions H, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , respectively. t 1 and t 2 denote the computing time for a scalar multiplication in G 1 and a pairing e, respectively.)
, attacker against our improved scheme. By utilising A, the challenger B can solve the Co-DBDH problem with advantage 1 ′ within running time t ′ . Based on the Co-DBDH assumption, our improved scheme's confidentiality is satisfied.
Assume B is given (q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P, aP, bP, Q, Z) as an instance of the Co-DBDH problem. B simulates the environment for A as follows:
Phase 1: Suppose that A outputs target multiple identities (ID 1 , . . . , ID t ) where t is a positive integer.
Setup: B sets P 1 ¼ Q and P pub ¼ bP. The public parameters (q, G 1 , G 2 , e, n, P, P 1 , P pub , H, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 ) is given to A, where n denotes the number of all the users.
Let T, T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 be some tables which will be used for storing the results of querying H, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , respectively.
H-query: Input ID j , B checks the table T. If there exists (ID j , x j ) in T, return x j . Otherwise, pick an integer x j [ R Z * q and put (ID j , x j ) in T, then return x j . H 1 -query: Input ID j , B checks the table T 1 . If there exists (ID j , l j , Q j ) in T 1 , return Q j . Otherwise, pick an integer l j [ R Z * q and compute Q j ¼ l j P for j [ {1, 2, . . . , t} and Q j ¼ l j P 2 P 1 for j Ó {1, 2, . . . , t}, then put (ID j , l j , Q j ) in T 1 and return Q j . 
w and put (s j , h j ) in T 4 , then return h j .
Phase 2: A issues private key extraction queries for ID j where j Ó {1, 2, . . . , t}. If there exists (ID j , l j , Q j ) in T 1 , then compute d j ¼ l j P pub ; otherwise, choose l j [ R Z * q and compute
. B performs the steps as follows:
Compute
where e(P pub , r j P 1 )e(U , l i P pub ) = e(bP, r j P 1 )e(U , l i bP)
= e(r j P, bP 1 )e(U , bl i P)
Challenge: A outputs a target plaintext pair (M 0 , M 1 ). Upon receiving (M 0 , M 1 ), B performs the steps as follows:
Phase 4: A issues private key extraction queries and decryption queries as those in Phase 2 and Phase 3. The restriction in the decryption queries is that C * = C. Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess b
Hence, C is a valid ciphertext. Otherwise, C is invalid. On the other hand, B successfully simulates the random oracles 
, where t 1 and t 2 denote the computing time for a scalar multiplication in G 1 and a pairing e, respectively.
A Notes: The proving process is very similar with Fan et al.'s proving process. The differences exist in Phase 3, Challenge and Phase 4. In order to make our paper self-contained, we describe the whole proving process in detail.
Theorem 2:
In the received ciphertext, it is computational difficult to build the relation of the receivers.
Proof: Suppose the received ciphertext is
From the Encrypt procedure, we know that
Thus, when the variable x denotes the values {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t }, the function l(x) obtains the values {a
t rQ t } and v(x) obtains {a 1 P pub , a 2 P pub , . . . , a t P pub }. As a i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t is picked at random from Z * q , then the values {a
t rQ t } are pairwise independent, and the values {a 1 P pub , a 2 P pub , . . . , a t P pub } are also pairwise independent.
When the variable x does not belong to {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t }, the attacker can obtain (P, P pub , {ID 1 , . . . , ID n }, U, v(x), l(x)). According to G-xyz-DDH-M problem, the attacker cannot decide which t users satisfy the relation of l(x) = f 1 (x)a
On the other hand, r is also picked from Z * q and V, W are random in the random oracle. So, U, V, W cannot help to build the relation of the receivers.
Thus, in the received ciphertext, it is computational difficult to build the relation of the receivers.
A Notes: Our receiver anonymity attack succeeds through building the relation of the receivers. For any two receivers (ID i , ID j ), the relation of e(Q i , l(x j )) ¼ e(Q j , l(x i )) holds. Thus, Fan et al.'s scheme does not satisfy Theorem 2. [8] . Thus, we omit this proof process. In fact, when the number of receivers is one, our scheme is the same as Fan et al.'s scheme. Fan et al. scheme's Theorem 3 is proved when t ¼ 1. Our scheme's Theorem 3 considers also the case t ¼ 1. So, the proof processes of the two theorems are the same.
Theorem 4:
The improved multi-receiver IBE scheme is ANON-sMID-CCA secure under the G-xyz-DDH-M assumption and DBDH-M assumption.
Proof:
The attacker trys to decide the receiver through two methods: (1) the attacker decides the receivers through building the relation of the receivers in the received ciphertext; (2) the attacker decides the receivers through decryption queries and private key extraction queries. We will show the two methods cannot succeed.
We prove this theorem by contrary evidence. Suppose A can succeed to attack the ANON-sMID-CCA of our improved multi-receiver IBE scheme. From Theorem 2, we know that the attack method (1) cannot succeed. Then, A can only decide the receivers through the attack method (2) . We consider the special case, that is, t ¼ 1. Thus, if the attacker A can decide the receiver, then it is paradoxical with Theorem 3. So, the improved multi-receiver IBE scheme is ANON-sMID-CCA secure according to Theorems 2 and 3. As Theorem 2 succeeds based on G-xyz-DDH-M assumption and Theorem 3 succeeds based on DBDH-M assumption, our improved multi-receiver IBE scheme is ANON-sMID-CCA secure under the G-xyz-DDH-M assumption and DBDH-M assumption.
A Notes: Why Fan et al.'s scheme cannot satisfy the receiver anonymity? The flaw exists that they only consider a receiver in their proving process. Our improved multi-receiver IBE's anonymity is proved in the multi-receiver case. Thus, our improved anonymous multi-receiver IBE scheme is ANONsMID-CCA secure.
Performance analysis and comparisons
We analyse our scheme's performance based on two cases: (1) computation and communication cost comparisons; (2) properties comparisons.
